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Studies have shown that public regulatory authorities can serve their self-
interest instead of the public interest. The US sugar market can be given as a 
concrete example of this situation. Regulatory action on the sugar market has led to 
the widespread use of high fructose corn syrup, which has been called the plague 
of the age. The production of high fructose corn syrup, which has increased daily 
in the US, has reduced sugar imports and significantly contributed to the economy 
with its undisputed role in the food sector. However, at the same time, the increase 
in chronic diseases and chronic health expenditures in the US has come to the fore 
as a problem that needs to be addressed. This study primarily focused on the 
activities of regulatory bodies and then emphasized the existence of the causality 
relation between the increase in high fructose corn syrup production and 
consumption and the increase in health costs. The findings of this study supported 
the negative perceptions and judgments the society has towards high fructose corn 
syrup. In addition, the study was conducted within the framework of the third best 
policy, which has been rarely used in the literature, and details how public 
efficiency can be achieved. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Regulatory authorities are independent structures organized in the form of 
supreme boards. The concept of “public interest” led to the birth of public 
regulatory authorities. However, economists have debated whether the public 
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interest is the main objective of such institutions (Kothari, 2010). In practice, the 
first examples of these institutions were found in the US where the Interstate 
Commerce Commission was established in 1887, and the Federal Trade 
Commission was established in 1914 for the prevention of unfair competition. The 
search to find a judicial solution to administrative problems in the US where an 
administrative jurisdiction organ did not exist resulted in the emergence of these 
structures (Lust, 1927; Sever, 2015). Similar institutions were established in Europe 
in the 1980s (Davis & Abraham, 2013) and in Turkey after the 1990s. The main 
debate is that these institutions, which are in charge of regulation and supervision, 
act to serve self-interest rather than the social interest because first politicians and 
then companies and bureaucrats can make legal regulations according to their own 
interests to ensure rent. In the literature, it is possible to find numerous examples 
supporting these findings (Milgrom & Roberts, 1998). Findings that regulatory 
authorities can serve self-interest rather than the public interest were first put 
forward in the 1960s with the theory of regulation by Joskow & Noll. The studies 
in this area were carried out in in accordance with the capture theory (CT), which 
was ignored in the literature. Findings have shown that regulatory activities 
conducted in non-competitive markets, such as natural monopolies, can actually 
serve self-interest rather than public interest.  
 
This study analyzed the effects of regulatory authority activities on health 
economics. For this purpose, focus was placed on the sugar market, which is one of 
the markets that most affected by regulatory activities. The study tried to explain 
how high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), a flavoring substance, became widespread 
in the market. Additionally, the effects of HFCS production and consumption on 
chronic diseases and the economic costs of these diseases were discussed. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In the 1960s, regulatory measures in the areas of trucking and air 
transportation increased rather than reduced the overall level of prices. Similarly, 
while regulatory actions in the US electricity market were expected to lead to lower 
electricity prices, they actually increased the overall level of prices. In addition, 
regulatory authorities established to control water pollution can serve the interests 
of companies instead of preventing the harm by industry to the environment. These 
negative situations were clearly revealed in the 1960s in the theory of regulation 
put forward by Joskow & Noll (1960) who concluded that policymakers see market 
failures as an important reason to engage in regulation. However, regulatory 
authorities established for this purpose cause a lower productivity level than the 
market failures (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971). 
  
As of the 1970s, the concept of market failure gave way to the concept of 
government failure. Neo-liberal policies gained ascendancy, and the role of the state 
was once again questioned. The development in technology and in the financial 
markets during this period positively influenced the competition environment. In 
turn, this created an environment suitable for the needs of interest groups. First, the 
areas under state monopoly that would be defined as natural monopolies are 
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exposed to privatization by the pressure of interested groups. Firms that buy these 
institutions as a result of the privatization of natural monopolies show efforts to 
become powerful in the market. The regeneration of these companies as 
monopolistic structures once again shines a light on the regulations (Posner, 1999).  
 
In 1972, William Jordan described this situation with the capture theory of 
regulations (capture theory or CT). In addition to monopolies, regulative actions in 
competitive markets increase prices and reduce the number of competitors. George 
Stigler, who introduced the theory of economic Regulation in 1971, stated that 
regulatory authorities are surrounded by economic interest. For example, the 
regulation of airline tariffs or the introduction of minimum quality standards for 
new firms reduces social welfare while contributing to company profits (Joskow & 
Noll, 1981). Capture theory is the first theory on the subject that shows that public 
regimes are unproductive, unsuccessful, and even vulnerable to corruption. It was 
also the basis for subsequent studies since it can be considered the first study in the 
literature on deriving personal benefit from the public regulatory authority. Thus, it 
is possible to establish meaningful models based on the interests between the state 
and the business world (Walters, 1993). 
 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s federal regulations limit 
competition and increase costs in cases where there are no regulations, which in 
turn reduce investments (Baker et al., 2008). As a result, the costs incurred by 
regulatory authorities are paid by individuals, i.e., taxpayers. This causes a decrease 
in the disposable income of individuals. Less income means less safety, less health, 
less education, less nutrition, less housing, and a lower quality of life, all of which 
make life riskier for individuals. Statistically, the expense that the regulator created 
in this field is more than $14 billion. This cost requires the regulatory agencies’ 
areas of activity to be redefined to reflect public interest (Keeney, 1997; Nar & Nar, 
2019). 
 
The US Department of Transportation’s auto-gasoline mileage regulations 
applied between 1981 and1984 were investigated in terms of economic efficiency 
and equity. According to these regulations, low-income groups with fewer cars 
were exposed to inequality compared to higher-income groups. Attempts were 
made to compensate low-income groups who experienced losses by additional 
income compensatory measures. Food stamps, fuel stamps, supplementary 
gasoline, low-income family assistance coupons, and discounts in income tax rates 
were applied within this context. However, these measures did not reach the 
intended goal (Lakhani, 1980). After sulfur dioxide emission regulations were 
applied in the US between 1975 and1990, electricity production costs, which should 
have reduced, increased by 1.1%, resulting in consumers receiving higher bills 
(Lee, 2002). 
 
The aim of the regulations in banking is to reduce financial fragility, prevent 
economic crises, provide stability, build competitive financial markets, strengthen 
public audits, and provide capital adequacy. However, it was found that regulations 






introduced to banks to increase financial security (e.g. deposits being listed under 
insurances, bank rescue operations) contributed more to the instability of the banks 
and increased existing risks (Allen & Gale, 2004; Demirgüç & Detragiache, 2002). 
 
The results of the regulations were directly reflected in the taxpayers’ 
budgets. This may result in an excessive interruption of Medicare premiums, a high 
rate taxation of wage income, a decrease in the payments people in need, reduction 
of meal allowances, and cancellation of housing assistance, etc. The IMF’s 
economists have calculated the size of these implicit subsidies as $ 83 billion 
(Herbst, 2013; Valdez & Molyneux, 2015). 
 
The basis of the problem is foreseeing that the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities are rational institutions that act with the public interest. Unfortunately, 
a great number of regulatory activities are carried out for either personal interest or 
political interest. For example, labor force costs and minimum wage regulations can 
be determined according to the interests of companies. In the current market 
conditions, the rules are made flexible, and unions are made inactive. Similarly, 
agricultural regulations continue to benefit a minority of people, preventing the 
application of sustainable public policies (Mesquit, 2017; Pawłowski, 2009). 
 
The most obvious example of this is the US sugar regulations. The US sugar 
regulations can be addressed in three separate periods. The first period is between 
1789 and1890, during which sugar production was not significant, and thus 
protection was not required. However, customs duties were applied in order to 
create income from sugar imports. The second period after 1890 is when import 
tariffs were removed to facilitate a high level of sugar intake, and domestic sugar 
processing factories were supported by the incentives. The period beginning in the 
1930s is the third period. In 1934, the Sugar Law was established to protect the 
domestic industry due to increased sugar production and falling prices. This law 
limited the import and production of sugar. The Sugar Law was terminated in 1974 
because sugar prices in the world increased approximately three times that year. In 
1977, a new protection policy was introduced into the sugar industry as a result of 
increased production and falling prices, and a regulatory authority was established 
under the name of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). In the face of falling 
prices, support for producer prices as well as credit programs were put into practice. 
These arrangements became permanent with the new Agricultural Law of 1981. 
Many changes in the year 2000 were carried out by the CCC to prevent the 
accumulation of sugar stocks in the US. In particular, payments in kind, as well as 
cash payment programs, are important for producers in exchange for restriction of 
the cultivation areas. In this respect, it was possible to reduce the cultivation areas 
by 7-10% (Grossmann, 2012; Kıymaz, 2002; USDA, 1996). 
 
The main regulatory agency in the US sugar market is the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), which determines the legal framework of the relevant public 
policies (IEG Vantage, 2018). Another institution operating in this area as an 
independent regulator is the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
which regulates and controls the commodity markets. These markets include 
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traditional agricultural products such as sugar, wheat, corn, and soya beans as well 
as nonagricultural products such as precious metals (CFTC, 2018). The aim of these 
institutions is to protect the rights of US farmers and businesses and ensure that 
they can continue their activities in fair terms in the global markets (Landis, 1987; 
Winden, 2004).  
 
Nowadays, US sugar regulations are carried out under the context of price 
support to domestic producers. In addition, low-interest loans, payment in kind, and 
down payment arrangements are in place. In addition, price and quantity quotas for 
foreign products are applied when required. The importance of sugar is governed 
by tariff-rate quotas under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the Uruguay Round Agreement (USDA, 2018). Notwithstanding, agriculture 
subsidies in the US are extremely unproductive transfer programs. The annual cost 
of price support programs, i.e. subsidies, under economic regulations is between 
$12.4 billion and $30 billion. Moreover, the loss created by quotas and taxes is 
between $12 billion and $18 billion. Therefore, in sugar markets, self-interest 
conflicts with the interests of the public, which in turn hinders social welfare (Nar, 
2013; Tullock et al., 2002). 
 
The USDA has stated that, in the event of sugar stocks becoming 
inadequate, it can intervene with the sugar markets to prevent an increase in sugar 
prices (Mueller, 2011). However, it is not known for whom or why these limitations 
are introduced or removed. At this point, interest-based relations between (i) 
politics, (ii) bureaucracy, and (iii) businessmen emerge. This triple structure is 
referred to as the “iron triangle” and directly targets the activities of the regulator. 
At the end of the day, politicians who are regarded to be acting for the public interest 
are actually pursuing vote maximization. It is understood that those who establish 
regulations are striving for bureaucratic maximization. It is also recognized that 
interest groups that are comprised of business people wish to seize public resources 
through lobbying activity. Along with the numerous corruption cases in Western 
democracies, the prevalence of interest groups in the US supports these evaluations 





















Figure 1. Iron triangle 
 
 
Source: (Iron Triangles, 2018). 
 
Figure 1 shows the actors involved in policy-making processes, namely (i) 
congressional committees, (ii) federal bureaucracy and (iii) interest groups. While 
these actors aim to maximize their profits within the political process, their interest-
based relations are as follows: (i) congressional committees provide financing and 
political support to federal bureaucracy and maximize their budgets. The 
bureaucrats who manage the bureau get power and income opportunities and their 
prestige increases in the society. (ii) The federal bureaucracy provides the interest 
groups with the necessary arrangements in line with the wishes of the Congress. 
(iii) The interest groups transfer part of the profits they earn to Congressional 
members in the form of donations or help and offer support for elections through 
lobbying (Burstein & Linton, 2002; Iron Triangles, 2018). 
 
One of the areas where this is often experienced is the Department of 
Agriculture. The three-dimensional structure is particularly evident in the 
agricultural sector. Government committees are the most important part of this 
frame. Both in the Senate and the House of Representatives, from allocations to 
quotas and tariffs, there are strong agricultural committees that present existing 
arrangements in favor of interest groups. These committees are “spending serious 
money to prevent declines of prices in the market”. For example, sugar is expensive 
in the US. This is caused by a successful pressure group comprised of groups of 
small sugar cane producers. Sugar cane does not grow well in the US. Although it 
is possible to supply sugar from other sources, a small but successful pressure group 
prevents imports; thus, a special monopoly occurs. As stated by Tullock, “a large 
part of the earnings is in the hands of lobbyists and a small number of large farm 
owners.” The amount transferred to the other farmers is around $1 billion and is an 
extremely small part of the cake. The resulting costs are not limited to consumers 
and taxpayers. This turns into a diseased structure that affects the whole society in 
the form of negative externality in the long run (Pawłowski, 2013; Tullock, 1989; 
Tullock, 2007). 
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First, the theoretical framework was prepared by conducting a detailed 
literature review about the research question. By doing so, the significance of the 
study and why the research question was worth studying was explained. The data 
used in the study were shown in metric tons. The difficulty of reaching the data as 
well as the classification of the data according to different weight units constituted 
the difficulties and limitations of the study. The fact that the weight units have been 
indicated in terms of pounds, short tons, and metric tons for different years made 
the calculations difficult. For this reason, calculations were made by converting 
them into the most useful method, namely metric tons. No studies were found in 
the literature that presented all the data together in metric tons. Thus, the data were 
presented in a uniform manner to facilitate future studies. 
 
Within the scope of the study, the data provided by the USDA and the U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services was compiled and transformed into tables 
and graphs. Correlation analysis (SPSS 20) was then used to determine whether 
there was a significant relationship between the variables and the degree of the 





Sugar Markets and HFCS 
 
Interest or pressure groups can intervene both directly and indirectly in 
political decision-making processes. These groups are able to change legal 
arrangements according to their self-interests and undertake rent-seeking activities. 
This is an important social as well as economic problem that has become a major 
dilemma in the US where lobbying activities are legal (Congleton & Hillman, 2015; 
Lambsdorff, 2002). Assessing the problem in terms of sugar markets will help in 
the understanding of the seriousness of the issue. 
 
When the history of the sugar cane plant is reviewed, we see that it first 
originated in New Guinea. It is thought to have spread to the southeast Asian islands 
more than 2000 years ago. Later it reached China, India, and the Middle East where 
refining techniques were used to transform the juice of the cane into sugary solids 
used in culinary applications. It then began to grow in the Mediterranean, especially 
in the south of Spain and Sicily (Richardson, 2009). The first production of sugar 
plants in the US began in Florida in 1850. However, sugar cane production and its 
processing industry could not develop because of the geographical proximity to 
Cuba. However, due to the embargo imposed after the revolution in Cuba, 
production has been growing rapidly since 1960. In addition, sugar became a 
political product under protection as the by-product of processing as well as its 
contribution to production and employment over the following years (Kıymaz, 
2002; OECD, 1998). 






Figure 2 shows the limited sugar cultivation areas in the US. Sugar beets 
and sugar cane are the two primary agricultural commodities used to manufacture 
sugar in the US. The crop quantity that can be taken from the soil is shown in metric 
tons. 
 
Figure 2. US production of sugar from sugar crops (1,000 metric tons) 
 
 
Source: (USDA, 2018). Sugar is produced in five US regions encompassing 14 States. The leading 
sugar producing region is the Red.  
The fact that sugar is expensive in the world has facilitated the emergence 
of alternative profitable substances. The five years during which two major price 
increases took place in the middle of the second half of the twentieth century, 
namely in 1975 and 1980, created turbulence for sugar production. From the 1960s 
to today, retail sugar prices have increased six times. This has rapidly expanded the 
market share of sugar-like products. This enlargement was clearly observed during 
those years in developed countries such as the US and Japan where the demand for 
sugar increased, but imports decreased (Kıymaz, 2002; White, 2014). The main 
reason for the reduction in imports was the existence of a “very successful, small 
pressure group which prevented imports” (Tullock, 1989). Problems regarding 
political instability and sugar cane production areas, as well as government 
interventions, caused a reduction in sugar supplies and an increase in prices. As a 
result, the current problems have primarily affected food and beverage producers 
and led them to seek new solutions. Within this context, the production of HFCS 
emerged in the US. In this respect, a new field of use for corn was established 
because it is the most grown crop in the US (Pomeranz, 2016; White, 2014). 
 
Essentially, the process of obtaining sweet substances from the starch of 
products such as corn, potatoes, and wheat dates back to the beginning of the 1800s. 
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In 1811, the conversion of starch into a sweet substance by heating it with diluted 
acid was carried out by Russian chemist G.S.C. Kirchoff. In 1831, the US, the 
country that produces the most syrup from starch today, established the first 
American plant that produced syrup from starch. However, until the 1970s, the 
production of starch-based sweeteners was carried out at an insignificant level. 
However, at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, the use of processed food 
products, especially by US beverage companies, increased significantly, causing 
this field of production to grow significantly. Due to the fact that corn is the most 
important cereal product grown in the US, syrup production from corn starch has 
become particularly common. The increase in HFCS production is almost certainly 
in parallel with the increase in population and consumption (BeMiller & Whistler, 
2009; Taubes, 2007; Bracking, 2009). 
 
After the year 2000, HFCS production in the US increased the market share 
in the sugar sector by more than 45% with an average production of 8.5 million 
tons. Japan and Canada followed the US in terms of production amount. HFCS 
production in the world is around 12.5 million tons. In Turkey, at the end of 2010, 
it was approximately 400 thousand tons. The European Union (EU) is the third 
largest sugar producer and the second largest consumer in the world. The use of 
HFCS in the EU has been limited due to the quotas of an average of 2% (EU Sugar 
Policy, 2018; Karaoğlu, 2011). 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, sugar production in the US exceeded eight 
million metric tons in the year 2000. US domestic producers have been protected 
from low world prices even during times when sugar production increased and 
world prices dropped with methods such as price supports, import restrictions, and 
production controls. When the prices around the world were high, the US 
government removed production limits. However, the US sugar regulations have 
caused domestic prices to rise further and more significantly than  those in the rest 
of the world. The consumption of sugar in the US peaked in the mid-1970s, 
exceeding nine million metric tons. In the late 1970s, however, consumption 
decreased, and this decrease continued throughout the 1980s. The main reason for 
this was the beverage sector’s shift to HFCS. In addition, domestic consumption 
increased during the 1990s and early 2000s due to the increases in the bakery, 


















Figure 3. Sugar production and consumption in the US 
 
 
Source: USDA-Economic Research Service. The amount of sugar production and sugar consumed 
in pounds and short tons were converted into metric tons. One metric ton (or ton) equals 1,000 
kilograms or a unit of weight equal to approximately 2,204.6 pounds. One short ton [US] equals 
0.907 metric tons. The data is compiled by the authors and can be quoted with reference to it. 
A correlation analysis was performed to examine the relationship between 
sugar production and consumption, and the Pearson correlation coefficient was 
obtained. Accordingly, a positive correlation of 66.2% was determined between 









**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Chart 1. Sugar production and consumption in the US 
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The positive dispersion relation between the two variables is shown above 
with the aid of a scatterplot (Chart 1). As a result, an increase in sugar consumption 
due to the increase in population and income also spurred an increase in sugar 
production (Barry et al., 1990).  
Figure 4. Sugar imports and HFCS production in the US 
 
 
Source: USDA-Economic Research Service. The amounts of sugar imports and HFCS production 
in pounds and short tons were converted to metric ton. One metric ton (or ton) equals 1,000 
kilograms or a unit of weight equal to approximately 2,204.6 pounds. One short ton [US] equals 
0.907 metric tons. The data is compiled by the authors and can be quoted with reference to it. 
Sugar imports in the US have been declining rapidly since 1975. The 
greatest decline in imports since 1967 was in 1982 at 2.8 million tons. Imports of 
sugar dropped to the lowest level of one million tons in 1987 (Figure 4). The main 
reason for the decline in sugar imports was the increase in HFCS production. HFCS 
has been systematically taking the place of sugar since the 1970s, which has caused 
sugar imports to decline. This is considered to be important in terms of the balance 
of foreign trade (Jurenas, 2004; Schmitz & Christian, 1993). The rapid adoption of 
HFCS, especially in the 1980s, led to the rapid transformation of the US sugar 
industry. This made HFCS a strategic product compared to refined sugar because it 
can be used in a wide range of products in place of sugar, the convenience of its use 
in soft drinks, and its lower production costs (Barry et al., 1990). That is why almost 
half of the caloric sweeteners in the US are produced from corn syrup (Mitchell, 
2005). 
 
Although the relative decline in HFCS production after the year 2000 is 
considered to be true, this is mainly related to the use of corn for increased ethanol 
production. In addition, as health-conscious consumers moved toward fresh and 






unprocessed foods, the industry demand decreased. Despite all of this, efforts to 
substitute HFCS for more expensive sugar were rapidly put in place (IBISWorld, 
2017; McConnell, 2017). The correlation analysis results of the present study also 








A negative significant correlation was found between sugar imports and 
HFSC at 76.3% (r0-0.763; p <0.001). When HFSC production increased by one 
unit, sugar imports fell by 0.763 units. The existence of the negative dispersion 
relation between the variables appears in the scatterplot as follows (Chart 2). 
Chart 2. Sugar imports and HFC production in the US 
 
When assessed in general terms, the reasons for sugar costs being high in 
the US, in addition to the influence of environmental factors since the climatic 
conditions are not well-suited for sugarcane cultivation in the US, are mainly due 
to federal sugar regulations. These regulations include tariffs, import quotas, and 
purchasing programs to protect domestic sugar producers against global 
competitors. Although these regulations create a relatively stable price level 
regarding the world market prices, they always create higher prices. For instance, 
in 2013, the price of refined sugar in the US was 66.02 cents/pound compared to 
22.84 cents/pound in the world markets. At the same time, the price of HFCS was 
38.64 cents/pound, almost half the price of sugar in the US. This is the main reason 
the consumption or use of HFCS in the sweetener sector has increased so much 
today. The market share of HFCS was only 5% in 1975 but rose to 44% in 1989, 
and, today, this percentage is nearly 50%. Nevertheless, non-official figures 
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emphasize that the HFCS use rates are well above this level (Ma et al., 2014; 
Schmitz & Christian, 1993). 
 
5. The Plague of the Age and Its Effects on Health 
 
In step with the significant increase in HFCS production, the consumption 
of HFCS has increased in a similar way. The number one HFCS producer in the 
world is the US. Additionally, the US is the second largest HFCS consumer in the 
world after India (Barry et al., 1990; Korves, 2011). Thus, the most relevant 
questions are what is HFCS exactly and what does it do? 
 
HFCS, known as the plague of the age, is different from normal sugar 
(Wellness Tips, 2007) because it is not a natural substance but an industrial food 
product. It is a chemical compound extracted from corn stalks through a secret 
process. HFCS contains harmful and toxic substances including mercury because 
chlorine alkaline, which is used to extract the corn extract, contains mercury. Cane 
sugar or beet sugar, namely sucrose, consists of two sugar molecules, 50% glucose 
and 50% fructose. The enzymes in the human digestive system break down sucrose 
into glucose and fructose and absorb it into the body. These rates, however, are not 
50-50 in HFCS. The fructose ratio is around 80-90%, which makes HFCS 
something different from a nutrient. What it is, though, is unknown (Hyman, 2011; 
Pleunie, 2017).  
 
Corn syrup is used as a thickener, sweetener, and moisturizer, especially in 
commercial foods. With the addition of corn syrup, products are able to maintain 
their freshness for long periods of time (Varzakas et al., 2012); they are more 
durable than traditional products, undesirable crystallization is inhibited, 
disadvantages such as adhesion and deterioration in packaging are eliminated, and 
products become easier to store and move. The most important advantage of HFCS 
is that it is 1.8 times sweeter than sugar and is produced 50% cheaper (Brown, 2019; 
Pleunie, 2017).  
 
The fact that HFCS performs the same function as normal sugar makes it 
possible to commercially substitute the two substances and consumers hardly notice 
the difference. It is critical that HFCS does not have a different flavor when 
replacing sugar. Therefore, in the US and Canada, almost all non-alcoholic 
beverage and syrup producers have shifted from sugar to HFCS (Varzakas et al., 
2012). 
It is clear that the increase in HFCS production has contributed significantly 
to the US economy. The added value of HFCS production in last 20 years is 2.0% 
of the annual average of gross domestic product (GDP). It is estimated that this ratio 
will increase to 3% in the next 10 years. However, the increase in chronic health 
expenditures along with the increase in HFCS production is more striking. In 1998, 
expenditures on chronic health issues reached 9% of the GDP in the US. By 2018, 
this share increased to 14% (IBISWorld, 2017; Statista, 2018). Therefore, the 
economic gain obtained from HFCS production can turn into chronic diseases and 






social costs resulting from the consumption of HFCS. As supported by the current 
findings, considered together, these costs surpass the economic gain.  
The term chronic diseases is used for diseases that require long-term care 
and are very difficult if not impossible to recover from (Dalal, 2000). Such diseases 
are caused by a number of factors such as genetics, the environment, psychology, 
and nutrition. The share of HFCS in nutritional-based chronic diseases is prominent. 
Fructose, a stronger sweetener than glucose, is absorbed very quickly by blood 
circulation, unlike sugar. After it reaches the liver, it is converted into triglycerides, 
namely fat. This is the main cause of liver damage and fatty liver. HFCS has also 
been proven to cause many other illnesses including tooth decay, diabetes, heart 
disease, cancer, dementia and obesity. Thus, HFCS is a subject that should be 
carefully evaluated in terms of its costs on health (Hyman, 2011; Lustig, 2013). 
 
In the US, the share of healthcare in the economy is increasingly growing, 
which means a greater economic activity compared to other sectors. For example, 
sectors such as the education, transportation and agriculture develop in line with 
economic growth, yet health care costs grow at a higher rate than the average (KFF, 
2012). To illustrate, total health expenditures in the 1970s were around $74 billion, 
and health expenditures per capita were only $355; however, in 2016, total health 
expenditures reached $3.3 trillion and health expenditures per capita increased to 
$10,000. In other words, while the share of health services in economic activities 
was 6.9% in the 1970s, it reached the very high level of 17.9% in 2016. As Figure 
5 shows, chronic health expenditure per capita, which was $266 in the 1970s, rose 
to $7.176 in 2016 (HealthData.gov, 2018; Peterson, 2018). The increase in chronic 
health expenditures in parallel to the increase in the consumption of HFCS is 
striking. 
Figure 5. HFCS consumption and chronic health expenditures in the US 
 
Source: USDA Economic Research Service (Per capita consumption of HFCS in the US from 1970 
to 2016 -in pounds). Health expenditures (HealthData.gov/U.S. Chronic Disease Indicators -CDI). 
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Health Expenditures (Tracker Peterson Kaiser-health system tracker). The data is compiled by the 
authors and can be quoted with reference to it. 
The results of the correlation analysis were also supportive of the current 
findings. 
 
Per capita Chronic Health 
Expenditures 





There was a significant positive correlation of 62% between per capita 
HFCS consumption and per capita chronic health expenditures (r = 0.620, p 
<0.001). It may be seen that, when per capita HFCS consumption increased by one 
unit, per capita health spending increased by 0.62 units. The display with the help 
of the scatterplot is as follows (Chart 3). 
Chart 3. HFCS consumption and chronic health expenditures in the US 
 
As one of the largest industries in the US, healthcare is steadily growing to 
meet the needs of an increasing population with an increasing life expectancy. The 
increase in chronic health expenditures in this growth is noteworthy (PAHO, 2001). 
Around 325 million adults in the US are struggling with chronic health problems. 
Seven out of 10 of the deaths in recent years were due to chronic diseases. (i) Lung 
and heart diseases, (ii) cancer, (iii) hypertension, (iv) Alzheimer’s (v), and diabetes 
and obesity stand out as the most common chronic diseases in the US. The two most 
important are heart disease and cancer, which account for almost 46% of death 
cases. Three-quarters of the country’s health expenditures are spent on chronic 
diseases. The annual cost of total cardiovascular disease is more than $400 billion. 
Cancer care costs are more than $200 billion, and the annual cost of diabetes is $245 






billion. Obesity is a serious health problem in the US with more than 94 million 
people categorized as obese. The cost of obesity-related medical costs exceeds $180 
billion annually. This leads to additional costs in terms of labor economics. 
Economy productivity is decreasing as people are allocating a significant part of 
their time to treatment (CDC, 2017; Fahey, 2017; Napalkov, 2009) 
The harmful effects of HFCS, which turns chronic diseases into epidemics, 
have also been proven by studies. In a study conducted with rats, it was found that 
the body weight of male rats consuming HFCS increased more than the rats given 
the same amount of sugared water. The same situation was observed in female rats 
as well. Animals that consumed HFCS gained 48% more weight than those who did 
not consume it. According to Professor Bart Hoebel, the results were very 
surprising. Even when the rats were fed a high-fat diet, it was not possible to 
observe this result. It can be said that the consumption of HFCS may contribute to 
the incidence of obesity when these results are adapted to humans (Bocarsly et al., 
2010; Ma et al., 2014). 
 
In another study, in which pregnant rats were used, the status of the mother 
and the developing fetus was examined after the rats were fed on HFCS. The effects 
of fructose, which is found widely in fruit juices, carbonated beverages, and ready-
to-eat foods, on the embryo and fetuses were investigated. It was found that the 
consumption of HFCS-supplemented foods negatively affected maternal metabolic 
parameters as well as the placenta and fetal development in the pregnancy period. 
The risk of postnatal illness was also found to increase (Ardebili, 2015). 
 
In another study, the brains of HFCS-consuming rats showed signs of 
slowing down. The memories and learning abilities of the rats were found to 
diminish. In the long term, consuming HFCS negatively affected the ability of the 
brain to acquire and remember information (Agrawal & Pinilla, 2012). According 
to Goldman (2009), the mercury used in the creation of HFCS is a dangerous 
material. Even low dose microgram exposures in the womb were found to damage 
the brains of unborn children (Opalinski, 2012). 
 
Many studies to date have shown that the consumption unnatural of sugar 
can cause pancreatic cancer. In a study conducted by the Nurses’ Health Study in 
the US, during an 18-year follow-up, out of the 88.802 women that participated, 
180 people were found to have pancreatic cancer. According to this study, tea sugar 
(sucrose) was not found to be associated with pancreatic cancer. However, corn 
syrup-rich diets significantly increased the likelihood of pancreatic cancer in a 
statistically significant manner. In the study titled Multiethnic Cohort, 434 out of 
162,000 subjects who were followed for eight years were found to have pancreatic 
cancer. As a result of the analysis, abundant amounts of fructose in HFCS were 
found to cause pancreatic cancer. Researchers at the University of Los Angeles 
found that fructose accelerated the proliferation of cancer cells. In a study 
conducted on pancreas cell tumors, it was seen that fructose was used as an energy 
source by cancer cells and caused pancreatic cancer by disturbing glucose 
metabolism (Bulut, 2017; Michaud et al., 2002). 
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In another study a drink containing glucose fructose was given to healthy 
subjects and patients with pancreatic cancer. As a result, the fructose concentration 
which was 1.9+/-0.4 mM in the healthy volunteers before drinking increased to 
16.3+/-1.2 mM in only 15 minutes. Fructose levels were also significantly higher 
in the volunteers with pancreatic cancer compared to the others (5.7+/-2.5 mM). 
This suggests that glucose fructose intake may have a significant effect on many 
other diseases, including pancreatic cancer (Hui et al., 2009). 
HFCS (high fructose corn syrup) is mostly produced from corn. A 
significant proportion of sugar (fructose) in processed liquids and solid foods comes 
from corn, which is a genetically modified organism (GMO), just like the soya bean 
plant. Corn is a plant that can easily become infected by harmful microorganisms 
such as bacteria, fungi, viruses, and parasites. Aflatoxin, a fungus toxic that can 
cause liver cancer, is common in corn. This is also the reason why HFCS is claimed 
to be responsible for digestive infections and various types of cancer (Erk, 2017). 
 
HFCS consumption causes elevated blood cholesterol levels and blood 
clots. HFCS inhibits the action of white blood cells that protect the body against 
infections. In a study conducted on patients with renal insufficiency, the uric acid 
ratio in the blood of the patients who consumed corn syrup was extremely high. No 
such adverse effects were found in the subjects that were fed with the equivalent 
amount of glucose or lactose (milk sugar) (Karaca, 2017). 
 
The introduction of HFCS in 1980, and sweeteners, namely aspartame, in 
1991, and the consumption of GMO products such as corn and soya bean doubling 
has caused serious threats to human health, a primary cause of the huge increase in 
chronic health expenditures in the US between 2000 and 2010. Studies conducted 
during the same period on this subject have shown that the number and quality of 
sperm in males dropped dramatically, and the risk of obesity and autism increased. 
The connection between low-quality sperm and the ratios of miscarriages support 
the findings related to HFCS damage (Dittmann, 2012). 
 
Although there are a number of studies addressing the harms of HFCS in 
practice, there are also studies that claim that HFCS is not harmful, but a significant 
portion of these studies are supported by the US Corn Refiners Association. In 
addition, given that HFCS is made from genetically modified corn, the problems 
related to it are twice as bad. This can also explain how HFCS, a chemical 
substance, transforms chronic diseases into epidemics. Therefore, HFCS is a 
substance that needs to be vigorously avoided. As White puts it, experimental 
studies in the USA show that there is a significant causal relationship between 
glucose fructose consumption and chronic diseases (Esposito, 2016; White, 2013).  
 
This result partly explains the explosion of chronic diseases in the US, where 
unprecedented levels of high blood pressure, obesity, diabetes (type II diabetes), 
and high cholesterol are observed. The US healthcare system is filled with health 
problems such as heart disease, stroke, kidney failure, gout, fatty liver, and reflux 






disease (Lyons, 2010). The role of sweeteners, especially HFCS consumption, is 
obvious in the increase of these problems. A product like HFCS, which was not 
available before 1970 in the US and whose usage increased 1,000 percent over the 
last 30 years should be considered closely (BWI, 2007). These results need to be 
analyzed carefully in terms of public health. The new food technology applied to 
meet the growing population needs is offering unhealthy food. This may lead to 




Sugar regulations in every country are different. For instance, the EU has 
legislated limitations on the quantity of the HFCS produced. Japan has also put 
quotas on HFCS production to protect the market share of sugar. However, in the 
US, current sugar policies are supported by HFCS producers because they benefit 
from high sugar prices (Bennett, 2010; Mitchell, 2005). HFCS is prohibited in 
France, the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Denmark, and the United Kingdom. The US dropped their 10% quota to 8%, while 
Turkey increased its quota from 10% to 15%. In Turkey, the government increased 
the starch-based sugar quota to 312,500 tons compared to 56 thousand tons in 
Germany, 53 thousand tons in Spain, and 32 thousand tons in Italy. Starch-based 
sugar consumption per capita in Europe is one kilogram, while in Turkey it is 
around six kilograms (Niemi, 2003; Yalçın, 2017). 
 
The need for sugar in the world and in Turkey increases daily. Today, the 
Turkish sugar market is under pressure from powers including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and multinational corporation. These 
powers actualize the policies they want in target countries through local politicians. 
Governments make laws and make bureaucracy arrangements, and interest groups 
share rents. The Sugar Institution, a regulatory and supervisory authority founded 
in Turkey in 2001, is a clear example of this situation. The objective of this authority 
is to meet the domestic sugar demand in Turkey with domestic production. In 
addition, it aims to increase exportation and maintain price stability in sugar 
production. However, the price of sugar has become even more expensive with the 
establishment of this regulatory authority. Turkey became familiar with concepts 
including sugar importing, illegal sugar, HFCS production, and HFCS imports, 
which it had not done before (Draycott, 2007; Kaymakçı, 2018).  
 
  The share of HFCS in total sugar production is expressed as a “quota”. The 
EU lifted its limits on sugar production and exports as of October 1, 2017, ending 
sugar quotas. European sugar producers can produce and export without restriction. 
Isoglucose production, however, seems to significantly increase market share in 
Europe, taking the place of sucrose, or sugar (Bache et al., 2014; European 
Commission, 2017).  
 
Isoglucose. according to EU law, is glucose fructose syrup or high fructose 
corn syrup. The European starch industry is expected to increase the production of 
isoglucose to above the current production level of 757.000 tons. It is estimated that 
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the production of isoglucose will reach 986.000 tons by 2028 due to market demand 
(Figure 6). Intensive demands from food and beverage manufacturers (soft drinks, 
ice cream, etc.) are particularly significant in this increase (Starch-Europe, 2017; 
Statista, 2020). 
 
Figure 6. Forecast volume of high fructose corn syrup produced in the European 
Union (EU 27) from 2015 to 2028 
 
Source: (Statista, 2020). 
The European Commission stated that it is tracking the consequences of 
abolishing quotas in the sugar and sweetener markets. Scientific evidence and 
policies are also being comprehensively investigated in terms of the possibility that 
high fructose causes excessive weight, obesity, and other health problems. The 
Commission has started to work towards this aim. In this process, it is necessary for 
all ingredients to be clearly stated on the labels of foodstuffs. By doing so, the aim 
is that consumers gain correct information about sugar content (European 
Parliament, 2017).  
 
When statements are evaluated in terms of political economy, the concept 
of efficiency and productivity emerges in the literature. The main objective of the 
economy is to provide efficiency. Efficiency is to do the right job, that is, to produce 
sugar. Productivity, on the other hand, is to do the job correctly, in other words, to 
carry out production at the lowest cost. However, the concept of productivity does 
not include efficiency. What is important in productivity is low cost and high 
profits. HFCS production implies this. Health problems that may arise due to the 
use of HFCS may lead to a significant burden on the economy in the coming 
periods. 
 
Furthermore, the third best policies makes it possible to better understand 
the HFCS problem. The third best policy depends on the amount of information 
available. It reveals the difference between a lack of information and a scarcity of 






information. It deals with situations where certainty is missing. Thus, the third best 
policies are combined with the first and second best policies (Nar, 2013). 
Figure 7. Third best policy 
 
Source: (Nar, 2013). The Third Best Policy is a combination of first- and second-best policies. It 
reveals the difference between a lack of information and a scarcity of information. 
 
According to the theory put forward by McGuire (1975), information is 
neither complete, as in the first best policy-market economy (100%), nor is it scarce 
(25%), as in the second best policy-public economy. The economy has an average 
information level (0-50%). Nevertheless, the information is raw and not compiled. 
The average information level provides information about the rest of the economy. 
When the issue of risks and probability estimates are added, the economy reaches 
effectiveness (Figure 7). Thus, the third best policy combines the first and second 
best policies. When not enough information is known about the rest of the economy, 
it is possible not to tax sugar and ignore externalities including the tax loss of the 
government. This theory shows that the analysis based on the third best of the rest 
of the economy may actually be useful. 
 
The debate in the United States over whether HFCS may be unhealthy and 
harmful or not remains fierce. One of the main reasons for the decline in production 
today is that people are becoming more aware and reducing their consumption 
because what exactly this substance is still an unknown issue. In the European 
Union countries, HFCS is expected to play a larger role in the market in the coming 
period. The EU Commission has started to examine the effects on health, and these 
studies are still ongoing. Therefore, since there is not enough information about 
corn syrup (sweeteners), no enforcement of taxes on sugar, the supporting of sugar 
agriculture, the subsidizing of it, and the providing of cheap credit will be extremely 
useful in terms of the rest of the economy. In this way, tax and similar losses 
suffered by the government will be much less than the health costs that HFCS is 
expected to cause. Under the high-profit margin, the emergence of human costs will 





 International Journal of Contemporary Economics and  
Administrative Sciences 
ISSN: 1925 – 4423  






The concept of public benefit has led to the birth of public regulatory 
authorities. However, these institutions have been made a part of corruption and 
irregularity with numerous laws. However, regulations must be prepared in 
accordance with the legislation and requirements of social, economic, and 
commercial life. The supervision of these institutions should be transparent. The 
relationship between the government and the regulator should be clearly defined. It 
is important to strengthen civil society organizations and the independent media for 
this purpose since most of the social facts are obtained from the media first hand, 
as stated by McChesney. Nonetheless, capitalist media communication systems are 
dominated by a handful of corporations and global oligarchs. The media should be 
protected from political supervision, and instead supervised by professional 
organizations and not allowed to engage in activities other than primary activities 
(trade, construction, energy, etc.)  
 
This study of US sugar markets revealed that the US Agricultural Agency 
prefers to prioritize the interest of a handful of minorities instead of public interest. 
This confirms the above findings and opens the way for the wide use of the HFCS 
substance in economies. The regulations in this area in the EU are carried out by 
the Commission. By October 2017, various EU countries banned the production of 
HFCS while others restricted it with quotas. However, it is clear that other EU 
countries will not be able to resist such a profitable item in the future. In Turkey, 
when the relevant regulatory authority became operational, sugar production first 
decreased, and then a boom in HFCS production and imports was experienced. 
 
According to Dr. Mark Hymana, director of the Cleveland Clinic Medical 
Center in the USA and one of the many doctors who opposes HFCS, this syrup 
represents fat, salt, chemicals, mercury, and dangerous and very low-quality food. 
It should definitely be avoided. However, the Corn Refiners Association has already 
targeted 700,000 medical doctors regarding the safety of the product. The US food 
industry accounts for 17% of the economy; in fact, this sector is so profitable that 
millions of dollars spent on convincing consumers and healthcare professionals of 
the benefits of this product. 
  
In order to hide the truth, HFCS may be released to the market under 
misleading labels such as natural sugar, corn sugar, corn syrup, inulin, starch based 
sugar, iso-glucose, dahlia syrup, tapioca syrup, glucose syrup, crystalline fructose, 
agave syrup, and even fruit fructose. By doing so, the aim is to conceal the reality 
of HFCS which actually leads to chronic diseases such as type 2 diabetes, heart 
disease, metabolic syndrome, osteoporosis, and cancer, and turn the negative 
perception in society into a positive one (Wellness Tips, 2007). In addition, the 
production process of this material is also unknown. Just like Pepsi and Coca-Cola 
products, production details are confidential. HFCS producers have defended the 
use of mercury in the production process, stating that it is not harmful, which is 
interesting. Expressions such as “the fish we eat may also contain mercury” are 






meaningless in such situations. Extreme profit has also blinded the eyes of the 
industry. Giving weight to sugar cultivation is important for creating healthy and 
sustainable generations. At this point, it is also important for consumers to choose 
more expensive sugar-based products instead of cheaper HFCS products that leave 
a bitter taste on the palate. Since it is not possible to eliminate the production of 
HFCS, the production of these substances should be limited to a minimum level. In 
addition, pregnant women, children, and people with health issues should be 
prevented from consuming this substance. In terms of this substance, which is said 
to have turned chronic diseases into epidemics, the economic benefits should be 
weighed against the social costs. 
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